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A central lesson drawn from the experience of the decades between the World Wars was
that the economic and political fate of the world could not be safely entrusted to unregulated, free
market national and global economic systems. History warned that this was a path to economic
instability, global depression and political chaos. In the aftermath of  World War II, national
economies, even those in which markets played a powerful role, would be placed under the
ultimate control of governments, while international economic relations would be consciously
managed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. Trade was expected to rise
in importance, but it was thought at the time that the degree of global financial integration would
remain modest, with cross border money flows under tight government control. The global
prosperity that characterized the quarter century following the war -- the “Golden Age” of modern
capitalism -- reinforced belief in the wisdom of social regulation of economic affairs.
The economic instability that erupted in the 1970s has led us back to the future. The
troubles of that decade created a powerful movement, led by business and financial interests, to
roll back the economic regulatory power of the state, replacing conscious societal control with the
“invisible hand” of unregulated markets -- just as in the prewar period. Though governments still
play a large role in most economies, they have ceded an enormous proportion of their economic
power to global markets. The economic theory used to guide and justify this transformation is
known as Neoliberalism. Neoliberal enthusiasts promised that this new laissez-faire era would
dramatically improve economic performance in both developed and developing countries.
Unfortunately, these promises have not been kept. In the Neoliberal era, global growth has slowed,2
unemployment has risen, financial crises are common, and inequality has increased almost
everywhere. The recent Asian crisis is just the latest signal that the basic structures of the new
global marketplace are dangerous to the economic interests of the majority of the world’s people.
What can be done to improve global economic performance?  We focus on three related
problems of the current era.  First, excessive financial market liberalization has created serious
speculative boom-bust cycles damaging to economic growth.  The financial collapse  that originated
in Thailand in 1997, spread to most of the nations of the Pacific region, and moved on to ensnare
Russia and Brazil, is but one example of the dangers of today’s liberalized capital markets. Second,
the  weakening of state regulation of cross border capital mobility in recent decades, and the
subsequent leap in the magnitude and speed of capital movement across national boundaries, have
caused governments around the world to shy away from expansionary budget and interest rates
policies because they displease global investors.  Governments that reduce interest rates or use
budget deficits to stimulate growth and lower unemployment are often punished by capital flight,
which raises interest rates and can trigger exchange rate crises. Third, the ongoing liberalization
movement has substantially reduced the economic power of developing country governments.
Since all the development success stories of the Post World War II era occurred in countries where
the government exercised substantial influence over economic activity, it is not surprising that
average growth rates in Latin America, Africa, and, recently, much of Asia have sharply declined.
We argue that the reimposition of government control over cross border capital
movements by both developed and developing economies, though certainly not a panacea for the
troubles of the era, can help in the resolution of all three of these problems. But first, we discuss3
the evolution of global liberalization and document the deterioration of global economic
performance in the past two decades.
II. From the Golden Age to the Neoliberal Era
As Western nations faced the transition from war to peace in the late 1940s, powerful
political forces developed in support of  a “Great Transformation” from control of economic life
through the blind forces of free markets to social or state responsibility for economic performance.
In the West, returning soldiers and an invigorated labor movement demanded that governments
guarantee full employment and rising wages. Even business became a reluctant supporter of the
new economic transformation because it feared the political and social consequences that would
follow if a return to the prewar system led once again to depression. Meanwhile, experience with
running war-time planned economies and new developments in the theory of government
economic policy associated with the Keynesian “revolution” provided the guidelines government
officials required to create and operate a state regulated peacetime economic system. A general
political consensus thus developed committing Western governments to the promotion high
employment and strong growth, and the use of tax and spending policy to contain inequality and
poverty and provide essential social services to all citizens, no matter what their income.
Government power to regulate national economic activity depended crucially on the
modest extent of global economic integration and on control of cross border economic activity.
Cross border mobility gives industrial and financial capital the power to frustrate government
policy. When money is free to flee the country in search of higher returns if the government tries
to lower interest rates in pursuit of growth, low interest rates may be impossible to sustain.  If4
inflation picks up even moderately at full employment, capital fight can boost interest rates,
triggering a recession.
For much of the Golden Age, however, governments did not have to confront this
problem. Outside the US, all governments tightly regulated the movement of money across their
borders. This allowed them to keep average interest rates low, which helped sustain strong growth
in investment and income. Moreover, trade was a relatively small percent of GDP and was subject
to government control; even the largest corporations produced and sold almost all their goods at
home. When governments used tax cuts and higher spending in pursuit of growth, their efforts
were not undercut by an excessive rise in imports.
Limited global economic integration and government control of cross border economic
transactions also gave governments an important degree of political autonomy from the business
sector.
1 By eliminating the run-away option available to financial and industrial capital, regulation
of capital flows and trade in the Golden Age gave governments the ability to choose, and the power
to achieve, policy objectives that did not have enthusiastic business support.
The Bretton Woods international financial system, created by the US in concert with
Britain at War’s end, was designed to reinforce the ability of governments to regulate their national
economies in pursuit of growth and full employment. The top negotiators for the US and Britain --
Harry Dexter White and John Maynard Keynes, respectively -- supported the expansion of trade.
But they believed that the growth of trade could not be sustained in the long run if money was
allowed to freely cross national borders, creating unstable exchange rates in the process. As
national economies became more trade dependent, exchange rate volatility would create ever5
increasing real sector instability.  To prevent this, the Bretton Woods system was based on fixed
exchange rates, which can only be maintained if governments limit cross border money flows.
Moreover, Keynes and White knew that governments would not be able to achieve sustained full
employment if financial capital was free to cross borders in search of higher interest rates or lower
inflation. To make the maintenance of both full employment and exchange rate stability possible,
the Bretton Woods Agreement authorized governments to regulate all cross border financial
transactions other than those needed to finance trade. “I share the view,” Keynes wrote in the early
1940s, “that central control of capital movements, both outward and inward, should be a
permanent feature of the post-war system.”
2
The general trend in the developing world was also toward state-led development, based on
industrial policy (through which the state directs resources toward sectors of the economy seen as
crucial to the development process), manipulation of interest rates, taxes and government spending
in pursuit of high growth, and government regulation of trade and cross border flows of real and
financial capital. This was obviously the case in Asia, where the spectacularly successful “East Asian
Model” relied heavily on state economic intervention, but it was true as well of much of Latin
America. Some of these governments were authoritarian, some were corrupt, and some did a poor
job of economic management; state power to regulate economic affairs is clearly no guarantee of
successful economic performance. However, on average, good growth rates were widely achieved.
In the words of Harvard economist Dani Rodrick:
The postwar period up until 1973 was the golden age for economic growth. Scores of
developing countries experienced rates of economic expansion that were virtually
unprecedented in the history of the world economy.
36
In the late 1960s, rising inter-nation competition, moderate inflation, international
payments imbalances and declining profitability began to weaken Golden Age institutions and
policies. The breakdown of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system and the burst of
inflation triggered by the first OPEC oil price tripling in the early 1970s caused further damage.
The second OPEC price hike in 1979-80 accelerated inflation yet again, creating exchange rate
instability and financial market chaos.
The 1970s proved to be a disastrous decade for US business and financial interests, leading
them to demand a drastic change in economic arrangements. In response, the US under President
Reagan and Federal Reserve Chairman Volcker, and the United Kingdom under Prime Minister
Thatcher, launched a second Great Transformation -- from the state managed Golden Age
institutions toward a market controlled system often referred to as the global Neoliberalism. Other
advanced industrial nations followed the lead of the US and UK, though not as quickly and
decisively.
4 Nations were pressed to deregulate, liberalize and privatize, and shrink the social safety
net. Government policy shifted focus from promoting growth and employment to minimizing
inflation.  Governments also began to give up control over not just trade, but direct foreign
investment and cross-border financial flows as well.  Global  markets thus became increasing
integrated.
These policies were, to a considerable extent, imposed on the developing nations of the
world by external agents -- the US and other G7 nations, the IMF and World Bank, and
multinational corporations and banks -- though domestic businessmen were often allies in this
project. The Third World debt crisis of the early-mid 1980s gave these agents considerable7
leverage. Given the large foreign debt buildup that took place in the developing world in the
1970s, the high interest rates and rising oil import bills of the early 1980s, along with the collapse
of export markets brought on by the global recession of the period, pushed many developing
nations to the verge of default.
The response of the “first world” was to impose a policy package on the debtor nations that
came to be known as the “Washington Consensus.” In return for loans, indebted countries had to
implement recession-inducing interest rate and budget policies which generated trade surpluses by
slashing imports, but created rising unemployment and falling wages as well.  Debtor nations were
also pressured to minimize their regulation of trade and capital flows.  These changes eliminated
key policy tools that developing country governments had used to guide their national economies
in the Golden Age. By the end of the 1980s, the only important area of resistance to Neoliberal
institutions and policies was East and Southeast Asia.
III. Neoliberalism: Promise and Performance
Proponents of liberalization argued that once the distortions created by government
interference were removed from global markets and the benefits of the new information based
technical revolution were free to flow everywhere, high growth, accelerated productivity gains, and
declining unemployment would follow. Financial liberalization would lead to lower interest rates
and higher global investment. Unconstrained by capital controls, credit and technology would
move from the capital and knowledge rich advanced nations to the opportunity rich poorer ones.
Free-market enthusiasts argued not only that maintenance of the status quo could only bring
continued instability, but also that market liberalization was the only economically and politically8
alternative to current economic structures and practices. This proposition came to be known by
the acronym TINA  -- There Is No Alternative to Neoliberalism.
Opponents of Neoliberalism argued that unregulated market systems, like the US in the
prewar years, suffer from cyclical instability, the maldistribution of income and wealth, and, on
occasion, depression. Unregulated global financial markets are especially unstable, generating
irregular patterns of bubbles, panics and crashes. Globalization, financial liberalization, the roll
back of the welfare state, and the rejection of activist government policy to regulate growth were
therefore seen as a recipe for sluggish and unstable economic growth, rising inequality and
perhaps, at some point, another global depression. They agreed that the status quo was unviable,
but insisted that any program of institutional and policy reform would have to contain an effective
regulatory role for the state in order to be successful.
The market liberalization revolution is now more than two decades old. On the basis of
economic performance to date, it is hard to make a convincing case that Neoliberal policies have
generated the results their supporters predicted for them.
Liberalization has proceeded at an impressive pace in recent decades. For example,
financial capital has become extraordinarily mobile. In 1977, in the midst of petrodollar recycling,
about $18 billion of currency trades took place daily; in 1983 the figure was $83 billion. In 1989, it
was $590 billion. By 1998, $1.5 trillion moved across borders every day.  Not surprisingly, such
hyperactive capital flows have been accompanied by frequent bouts of domestic and international
financial instability as well as increased volatility of exchange rates. John Eatwell reported that on
average, “the monthly volatility of G7 exchange rates has tripled, with far larger increases in9
volatility being experienced by [developing] countries.“
5
But has such freedom of capital flows brought lower real (or inflation adjusted) interest
rates as promised? On the contrary, the current era has seen the highest real interest rates of
modern times. For the G7 nations, real long term interest rates averaged about 2.6% from 1959-
70, 0.4% from 1971-82, but jumped to 4.9% in the 1983-94 period.
6 High interest rates are one
reason why inequality has risen in recent decades; ever larger shares of national income are being
transferred from workers and other income claimants to owners of financial assets, who are the
richest group in society. With interest rates and exchange volatility risk so high, it is not surprising
that most studies report a slowdown in capital investment.
Most important, economic growth has slowed significantly. The most widely cited data on
global growth rates was compiled in 1995 by Angus Maddison for the Organization for Economic
Cooperation. He reports that while annual real GDP growth in the world economy averaged 4.9%
in the Golden Age years from 1950 to 1973, it slowed to 3.0% in 1973-92. Western European
growth rates fell from 4.7% in the early period to 2.2% in the latter. Latin America’s growth
averaged 5.3% from 1950-73, but only 2.8% from 1973-92. Africa grew at a 4.4% pace in the first
period, but at a 2.8% rate in the second one. Asia, the last bastion of state led development, was
also the only major area not to experience a significant post Golden Age slowdown, maintaining
growth between 5% and 6% for the entire era.
7
We get the same results if we focus on the 1990s. World GDP growth averaged but 2.2%
from 1990-98, the slowest growth of the post war era.  Developed nations had an average GDP
growth rate of only 2.1% from 1991-98.
8 Latin America growth averaged 3.2% from 1990-97,10
better than in the “lost decade” of the 1980s, but much lower than in the Golden Age. Desperate
Africa showed GDP growth of only 1% a year from 1990-97. By way of contrast, the state led
economies of Asia grew by 6.5% from 1990-96, prior to the outbreak of financial crisis in that
region.
9 Other crucial performance indicators, such as average unemployment and productivity
growth rates, show the same pattern.
It has been argued that at least the US, as the master of the new information technologies
and the pioneer of corporate restructuring, has prospered in the current era. But the concept of
US exceptionalism is not supported by the data. US GDP growth averaged 4.2% a year from 1959-
73, but only 2.6% in the Neoliberal years from 1980-98. From 1990-98, growth was only 2.5% per
year. Annual growth in labor productivity fell from 3.2% from 1959-73, to under 1.3% from 1980-
98; it was 1.4% in the nineties. And the average US unemployment rate, which was 4.8% from
1950-1973, rose to 6.6% in 1980-98.
10 The US has also run the largest trade deficits in the world
in the past twenty years. It is true that some aspects of US performance has improved in the past
three years (though the current account deficit will likely hit $300 billion for 1999), but whether
this is the start of a marvelous “new era” or just a typical end of business cycle performance
remains to be seen. [revisions from Dymski-Isenberg, 17-18?]
If we look below national economic performance and examine the situation confronting
ordinary American workers and their families, things look even worse. Following an era of
impressive growth from the War’s end through 1973, the median real wage of all full time workers
fell by 5.5% between 1979 and 1997, while the male median wage declined by 15% in the same
period. The drop in male wages affected all but the highest paid workers. The real wage of male11
college graduates was lower in 1997 than in 1973. Median real family income rose by 2.9% a year
from 1947-73, but by just 0.2% per year from 1979-97.
11 Even that small gain was achieved only by
a substantial increase in hours worked per family each year. In addition, both wage and family
income inequality rose substantially, and the poverty rate rose moderately over the past two
decades.
In 1997 the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development evaluated global 
economic performance in the Neoliberal era. Their report drew the following conclusions.
•   Taken as a whole, the world economy is growing too slowly to generate sufficient
employment with adequate pay or to alleviate poverty;
•   This has accentuated longstanding tendencies for divergence between developed and
developing companies;
•   Finance has gained the upper hand over industry, and rentiers over [business] investors;
•   Capital has gained in comparison with labour, and profit shares have risen in developed
and developing countries alike;
•   Growing wage inequality between skilled and unskilled labour is becoming a global
problem;
•   The hollowing out of the middle class has become a prominent feature of income
distribution in many countries;
•   There is almost everywhere increased job and income insecurity.
12
It is often asserted that while subgroups like the unskilled and uneducated have suffered,
liberalization has been good on average, for most people, and for most countries. But the available
evidence is inconsistent with this proposition. Economic performance has deteriorated -- on
average and for majorities -- virtually everywhere but in pre-crisis Asia.
IV. What is to be Done? The Contribution of Capital Controls to the Restoration of Global
Prosperity
13
The evidence presented in the previous section indicates that there are many serious
economic problems in today’s global economy. Here we focus on but one key question: what can12
be done to reverse the global growth slowdown?
Widespread liberalization of domestic financial markets and cross border capital flows has
slowed developing country growth in two important ways.
14 First, liberalization has created serious,
recurrent speculative boom-bust financial cycles that have constrained average growth rates.
Second, by weakening or eliminating capital controls and state regulation of credit
allocation, financial liberalization has made it difficult to adopt and impossible to maintain the
state guided development models that were in large part responsible for the high Third World
growth rates experienced in the Golden Age and the decades-long East Asian “miracle.” The most
effective of these models relied on capital controls to help stabilize financial markets and limit
speculation, facilitate government control of interest rates, reinforce state control over the
allocation of credit flows (an important tool of industrial policy), and prevent the disruption of
sustained economic expansion by capital flight.
15 
Turning first to the issue of financial instability, it is clear that financial liberalization has
dramatically increased turbulence in global financial markets.  “Financial crises seem now to
happen with almost monotonous regularity,” The Economist recently observed.
16  Moreover, every
serious developing country financial crisis of the past two decades was preceded by financial
liberalization. A recent United Nations report states that “financial deregulation and capital
account liberalization appear to be the best predictors of crisis in developing countries.”
17
It is now widely acknowledged that liberalization of domestic financial markets and cross
border capital flows was a key cause of the recent Asian crisis.
18  According to Joseph Stiglitz, the
World Bank’s chief economist,“it is unlikely that the [Asian] crisis could have occurred without the13
liberalization of capital accounts.”
19 Problems began with the acceleration of financial liberalization in
the 1990s. Foreign investors were anxious to take advantage of  the opportunity to profit from the
“miracle” economies of Asia that such liberalization offered. When Asian markets opened to them,
they poured money in. In 1996 alone, there was a net inflow of $93 billion in private foreign
capital into the five countries most affected by the crisis. Most of the capital was short term, and
most of the short term capital was bank loans, not portfolio investment. Korea alone doubled its
foreign debt from $60 billion in 1994 to $120 billion in 1996; two thirds of this debt was short
term.
Much of the foreign money was used, either directly or via intermediation through local
financial institutions, to help fuel speculative investment booms. Between 1986-90 and 1991-95,
investment as a percentage of GDP rose from less than 32% to almost 38% in Korea, from 23% to
39% in Malaysia, and from 33% to over 41% in Thailand.
20 In Thailand, residential and
commercial real estate were the primary targets of speculation, though stocks were also important.
Loans from domestic and foreign financial institutions to Thai property developers almost tripled
between 1993 and mid 1996, eventually creating a rising excess supply of housing and office space
that triggered a price collapse in 1996. Foreign capital inflows also helped push Thai stock prices
up by 150% between 1991 and 1994, then helped sustain them at an inflated level until the
market burst in 1996. In Korea, short term foreign capital flowed primarily into capacity expansion
in basic industry. The problem here was that much of this capital was invested in industries, such
as autos and semiconductors, in which Korea already produced far more than it could consume
domestically -- two thirds of auto production was targeted for export -- and export prospects were14
poor because of large global excess capacity. For example, over-supply drove the price of
semiconductors, Korea’s major export earner, down by almost 80% in 1996.
21
We should not be surprised that a good deal of the capital flowing into Asia turned out to
be invested imprudently. At any point in time, there is a limit to the number of investment
projects, private and public, that offer an attractive rate of return. Domestic saving in East Asia, at
30 to 40 percent of GDP, was large enough to finance almost all profitable projects. There may
have been unusually large public infrastructural projects and key foreign technologies that require
foreign financing (which should have been done on a long term basis), but with this important
exception, the additional Asian investment projects funded with foreign money were likely to be
only marginally profitable. As Furman and Stiglitz noted:
In the case of East Asia, where the saving rate was very high, the benefit to the extra capital
accumulation that followed liberalization may have been relatively low.
22
In sum, local firms and banks had used short term foreign loans to finance long term,
risky, domestic investment. This meant that any number of not unlikely events could trigger a
repayment crisis -- a rise in foreign or domestic interest rates, a fall in the exchange rate (which
would make repayment through domestic earnings harder), a rise in the exchange rate (which
would lower the export earnings of domestic firms), an increase in the trade deficit, the end of an
asset bubble, or a fall in domestic profit rates. Over-reliance on short term domestic loans to finance
long term investment is unwise; over-reliance on short term foreign loans to do so is grossly
irresponsible.
By 1996 it was becoming clear to informed observers that the speculative real estate and
stock markets booms in Thailand were ending, as all such booms must. Domestic and foreign15
investors began to shift money out of the country, which caused a collapse of domestic asset prices,
and put downward pressure on the bhat. The government had maintained a fixed bhat\dollar
exchange rate for many years to attract foreign investors by eliminating fear of exchange rate loss.
They continued to defend the bhat in 1997, but the rising swell of money leaving the country
forced them to let it float in July. It proceeded to sink like a stone. Panic eventually spread to other
markets in the area. The huge capital inflow of 1996 was followed by a net capital outflow of $12
billion in 1997. This one year turn around of $105 billion was about 11% of the pre-crisis GDP of
the five affected countries.
No financial system in the world, no matter how modern or well regulated, could have
withstood such drastic capital flow volatility without experiencing economic trauma. In the US, for
example, a proportionate year to year capital flow swing would be almost one trillion dollars,
enough to create financial chaos. Foreign banks pulled $36 billion out of the area in 1997. Since
their loans had financed long term investments, repayment of principal out of profits was not
possible, while the forced sale of assets purchased with the loans only worsened the collapse in
their prices. Naturally, Asian currencies plunged, interest rates spiked, domestic banks either
became insolvent or stopped making loans out of fear of insolvency, large numbers of local firms
went bankrupt, and the whole area sunk into recession.
 Korea, Thailand and Indonesia were forced to sign agreements with the IMF to avoid debt
default. Governments were ordered to raise interest rates dramatically and to run budget surpluses
in order to induce recessions, thereby generating the trade surpluses needed to pay back the debt.
The IMF even demanded the removal of all remaining controls over short term capital flows, in16
spite of the fact that most observers believed that the relaxation of previously tight controls helped
cause the crisis in the first place. Most important, the US dominated IMF took advantage of the
weak bargaining position the crisis had put these countries in by making its loans contingent on a
commitment to adopt lasting Neoliberal reforms.
By contributing to the outbreak of severe financial crisis, the irresponsible deregulation of
domestic financial markets and the weakening of controls over international capital flows across
Asia helped bring the fastest growth area on earth to its knees. Korea’s economy shrank by 5.8% in
1998 after growing at a 7.1 % rate in 1996; Indonesia’s GDP fell by 13.1% last year after rising by
8% in 1996; Thailand’s economy suffered a 7.6% contraction in 1998 compared with 5.5%
growth in 1996; Malaysian GDP fell by 6.7% last year as opposed to an 8.6% growth in 1996; and
the Phillippines’ economy dropped 0.5% in 1998 after growing 5.7% in 1996. The shift from high
growth to stagnation in Asia lowered global growth to about two percent a year in 1998 and 1999.
In my view, however, the greatest threat to developing country growth prospects in the
longer run in the current era may come not from the effects of recurrent short term financial
instability per se, but rather from the pervasive pressure in this period to eliminate state led
development models. As noted, not all efforts at state led development have been successful, but,
contrary to current conventional wisdom, all successful development experiences to date have
relied on substantial state economic regulation. It is hard to think of a single example of high
growth sustained over a long period in a developing country, in either the prewar or post war era,
in which the government did not consistently violate key tenets of Neoliberalism and deliberately
interfere in important ways with market processes.17
Until the crisis, Asia was living proof that TINA was an ideological slogan rather than a
scientific law. Though the precise economic role played by the government varied from country to
country, for three to four decades most of Asia relied heavily on state economic intervention,
including the widespread use of capital controls, to maintain the highest growth rate in the world.
East and Southeast Asia accounts for only about 25% of global production,
but it generated about half of global growth from 1990 through 1996. If the current IMF-driven
liberalization of Asia results in the replacement of  East Asian development models with Neoliberal
structures (an outcome which, though uncertain, is the stated intention of the liberalizers), it will
likely signal the end of above average growth rates in the area, and thus perhaps a permanent
decline in global growth rates.
But, in my opinion, the damage done by free capital mobility is not limited to less
developed nations. Unregulated capital movement also prevents developed country governments
from consistently creating enough growth to generate rising wages and low unemployment. Fast
growth and sustained low unemployment may at times be accompanied by rising inflation, a
deterioration of the trade balance, and a falling exchange rate. Inflation and falling exchange rates
in turn induce financial capital flight because they erode the return on domestic relative to
overseas investment. Meanwhile, the wage increases that often accompany low unemployment may
motivate industrialists to shift production abroad. In the absence of capital controls, the mere
anticipation that these events will follow the implementation of expansionary policy can trigger a
rapid money capital outflow, which itself will kick interest rates up, put downward pressure on
stock and bond prices, depress the exchange rate, and increase inflation. With capital now able to18
flee en masse at the first premonition of trouble, problems that expansionary policy might have
generated only slowly and in concert with its benefits in previous decades are now magnified by
capital mobility and appear before the benefits of the policy have a chance to develop.  Capital
mobility thus destroys the economic viability of expansionary government policy even in developed
countries because it simultaneously raises its costs and lowers its expected benefits.
Most economists do not doubt that capital flows can be controlled if the government is
determined to control them. Debate concerns the costs and benefits of controls. Opponents of
controls believe that unregulated markets operate with impressive efficiency. Since controls
interfere with market processes, it is assumed that they must have serious costs, yet because the
efficiency of markets is taken for granted, their potential benefits are seen as modest at best.
Supporters of capital controls agree that they can have costs, especially if poorly implemented.
Controls can be used to protect domestic monopolies, reduce the efficiency of the price
mechanism, and create incentives for corruption. History contains many examples of the misuse of
controls. But it also reminds us that in the Golden Age and even beyond, almost all advanced
countries used controls on both inward and outward capital flows to help generate sustained high
growth. So did most developing nations. The creation of the economic “miracles” in Japan, Korea,
Singapore, Taiwan and later China would have been impossible without strict regulation of capital
movement.
The financial panic that raced across the globe following the Asian crisis has put the debate
on capital controls back on the political agenda. And the fact that those Asian countries that
maintained strong capital controls, such as Taiwan, China, India and Vietnam, did not suffer the19
direct effects of the crisis, has strengthened the position of those who support controls. The
Financial Times ran an article titled ‘Japan: Government ponders capital
controls.”
23 The Wall Street Journal reported that German Chancellor-Elect Gerhard Schroeder
“gave his strongest endorsement yet of placing greater controls on international capital flows and
restructuring the global financial system”; it noted that the French government shared his view.
24
Business Week expressed concern over “the anarchy of markets that globalization has unleashed,”
adding that “the idea of limited capital controls is picking up support from top economists as
well.”  It quotes the World Bank’s Joseph Stiglitz as arguing “that it’s time to consider some form
of taxes, regulations, or restraints on international capital flows.”
25  The New York Times observed
that there is “a growing number of economists calling for new steps to control these capital flows
or at least soften their impact.” The article points out that “it is the holdouts with respect to capital
controls, like China and India, that have weathered the crisis much better than the others, because
they were not vulnerable to a sudden exodus of capital.”
26 Respected Financial Times columnist
Martin Wolf argued that
it is impossible to pretend that the traditional case for capital market liberalization remains
unscathed. ... After the crisis, the question can no longer be whether these flows should be
regulated in some way. It can only be how.
27
Finally, the Asian crisis led influential Harvard economist Jeffrey Sachs to conclude that
governments must control short term capital flows, limiting inflows to the amount needed to
finance trade, while prohibiting their use in financing long term investment. “One could approach
such limits through taxation...or through outright supervisory limits,” he argued, adding that the
thesis that “short-term flows essentially cannot be controlled is not convincing.”
28 20
Policies to control cross border capital movements could be implemented at the
international and\or domestic levels. A system of international controls on capital flight could be
negotiated that required countries to return capital that entered their markets in violation of the
laws of the nation of origin. Both Keynes and White supported such international cooperation,
which would be especially helpful to the efforts of smaller, poorer countries to enforce their
controls. International cooperation in monitoring and controlling the movement of funds is
already occurring, as countries look for more effective ways to restrict the laundering of drug
money and minimize the extent of tax evasion by their multinational corporations.
The Tobin Tax a small percentage tax on all foreign exchange transactions, is another
globally coordinated measure which has received wide support among academics and some
international organizations.
29 It is designed to discourage excessive short term speculation -- 80
percent of all currency transactions are reversed within one week -- without impeding longer-term
capital flows. Tobin points out that such a tax would have to be levied globally, or at least in all
major financial centers, otherwise foreign exchange transactions would simply move to an untaxed
locale. Of course, if the US and Britain simply announced that no country that failed to enforce
the Tobin tax would be allowed to use Anglo-American financial markets, the rest of the world
would immediately agree to enforce it.
However, there are serious limitations to the Tobin Tax as a mechanism for dealing with
very large speculative flows of short-term capital such as those associated with the recent Asian
crisis. Such controls are, in the present political environment, most likely to be implemented at the
national or regional levels, where they are more feasible politically. Progressive cross border labor21
and citizen alliances are developing, but are not yet at the point where they can have a serious
impact on global economic policy. As Manfred Bienefeld explained: "The focus on nation states
derives primarily from a pragmatism born of a total inability to conceive, let alone construct, a
meaningful political process at the global level."
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 A paper I published with Gerald Epstein
31 and the United Nations Trade and
Development Report 1998 are two of many available sources that discuss in detail the great variety
of capital controls that have been used successfully by a large number of nations in the post war
period. There have been a dazzling array of quantitative or size restrictions on the flow of capital
used by different countries at different times. For example, in 1975, 17 industrial countries and 85
developing countries had some types of quantitative restrictions on international capital
transactions on the books.  By 1990, 11 industrial countries and 109 developing countries still had
legislation that enabled their use. Other powerful and widely used forms of control over financial
capital include restrictions on bank lending to non-residents, dual exchange rates to reduce the
impact of capital movements on the costs of imports and exports, and strict rules on importing and
exporting foreign currencies.
However, I would argue that the easiest and most efficient way to reduce destructive capital
mobility is to use a well developed, politically accepted institution which all industrial countries
rely on --  the tax system.  The great advantage of using the tax system is that it involves no new
bureaucracy and, at least in the advanced countries, is reasonably cost effective. Consider first the
imposition of a tax on the sale of financial assets, which could be limited to the sale of assets held
for less than some target length of time if desired. Such a tax is sometimes referred to as a “Keynes22
tax” because in The General Theory Keynes argued for the “the introduction of a substantial
government transfer tax on all transactions” in the stock market in order to minimize speculative
trading.
32 The Keynes tax is a natural complement to the Tobin tax because before a large sum of
money can flee a country, it must first be accumulated by a speculator through the sale of domestic
assets or by borrowing.  Taxing the sale of the asset and taxing the foreign exchange transaction
should have the same qualitative effect on the profitability of flight. Most important, a Keynes tax
can be applied unilaterally. 
Similar results could be obtained through changes in the provisions of the capital gains tax:
penalty rates (relative to ordinary income) applied to the sale of assets held for less than some target
period could be very effective. Tax systems have also been used to change the relative returns on
foreign versus domestic financial assets.  Institutions such as pension funds and insurance
companies hold large and rapidly rising shares of advanced country domestic financial wealth, and
they are trading securities across national borders at an increasing rate.  By taxing the gains from
cross border investments at a penalty rate and by discriminating against the deductibility of cross
border losses, governments could substantially reduce the propensity of money to move into and
out of the country.
A major advantage of using the tax system to regulate capital movement is that it is easy to
change the rate of taxation from time to time; the government can thus encourage, as well as
discourage, capital flows when it seems advisable to do so. Chile has used a tax-like mechanism to
successfully regulate short term capital flows. Chileans who take out foreign loans with a maturity
of less than one year must deposit a percentage of the loan in a non-interest bearing account at the23
Central Bank. By varying that percentage, the government has exercised substantial control over
the volume of short term foreign borrowing.
Enforcing international capital controls need be no harder (but, of course, also no easier)
than imposing taxes.  Taxes, like capital controls, are, to some degree, evaded.  It costs money and
takes effort to collect taxes, as it does to control capital mobility.  But where there is a will to collect
taxes, they are collected. Changes in the tax law would simply extend this mechanism to the
regulation of international capital mobility.
It is often argued that any attempt to implement capital controls is self-defeating because
capital will flee the country as soon as the enforcement legislation is given serious political
attention, before the controls can be implemented.  There is some validity to this argument, but it
applies as well to any serious policy proposal (such as low interest rates, higher taxes on the rich or
tighter financial market regulation) perceived to be against the interests of the wealthy.
Careful consideration suggests that this impediment to the effective use of controls is
manageable.  If capital controls are part of a sensible general plan to raise the rate of economic
growth and reduce economic uncertainty over the longer run, some holders of longer term real
and financial assets might not see flight as their most profitable option. Keep in mind that fast-
growth East Asian countries had no trouble raising foreign capital even when their capital  controls
were extremely tight. More important, the sequence in which various controls are introduced can
limit the severity of capital flight.  Suppose relatively moderate Keynes and Tobin taxes are
introduced first.  If more powerful controls are contemplated thereafter, they can be preceded by a
substantial rise in the magnitude of these taxes --the cost of flight can be raised just as the incentive24
to flee goes up.  In the same vein, taxes on some transactions involved in the flight of capital can be
applied retroactively, again limiting the gain from flight.  And it is possible to enact standby
controls in conditions where there is no immediate plan for their implementation.  At some future
time when more comprehensive controls are needed, the standby controls can be used without
prior notice to prevent anticipatory capital flight.
According to a recent study of financial crises by the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development:
Use of capital controls has been a pervasive feature of the last few decades. In early postwar
years capital controls for macroeconomic reasons were generally imposed on outflows as
part of policies for dealing with balance-of-payments difficulties and for avoiding, or
reducing, the size of devaluations. Moreover, there was widespread use by both developed
and developing countries of controls on capital inflows for...longer-term development or
structural reasons... With the return to freer capital movements from the 1960s onward,
large capital flows caused problems for the governments of certain industrial countries such
as Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland, which responded with various controls...
More recently, a number of developing countries experiencing similar macroeconomic
problems as a result of large capital inflows have resorted to capital controls as part of their
policy response.
The continued outbreak of “financial crises and the frequent recourse by countries to controls to
contain the effects of swings in capital flows,” the study concludes, strongly points to the need for
governments to continue to regulate capital mobility.
33 It is clear that there are no serious technical
or economic -- as opposed to political -- impediments to the use of capital controls.
V. Conclusion   
Enough evidence has accumulated to make a strong case that relatively unregulated,
globally integrated markets generate slow growth, high unemployment, financial instability and
rising inequality in the current era, just as they did before the Golden Age. If economic25
performance is to improve significantly, governments will have to reverse course and rebuild their
capacity to intelligently regulate market processes in the national interest.  
Two immediate challenges are posed by the issues considered in the last section. The first is
political. Globalization has greatly increased business control of domestic political priorities. A way
must be found to replace the demands of business, finance, and the wealthy with the interests of
the majority as the main concern of government economic policy.  The second is economic.
Conditions must be created that make expansionary macroeconomic policy more effective
everywhere, and once again permit developing country governments to adopt state led growth
models. Both tasks would be facilitated by the widespread reimposition of capital controls. That
controls are feasible is not in dispute even on the right: as The Economist put it, those "who
demand that the trend of global integration be halted and reversed, are frightening precisely
because, given the will, governments could do it.”
34
Capital controls can help with the political challenge by regulating and reducing capital
mobility, thereby eliminating one of the main channels through which business and financial
interests dominate the political process. As Dani Rodrik put it, under current conditions, “it is
global markets that dictate policy, not domestic priorities” (99, 15); controls can help reverse this
political imbalance. Controls would also help meet the economic challenge because they make
expansionary macroeconomic policy more effective by substantially reducing its costs and raising its
benefits. They also give developing country governments an essential tool for the guidance of
national economic growth.26
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